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Landslide: The “Obama Surge” and the
Future of California Politics
Abstract: The 2008 presidential election in California resulted in a landslide of
historic proportions. Barack Obama’s victory, fueled as it was by 2.1 million firsttime voters, seemingly portends a realignment in California. At the same time,
outside the presidential election, the results in 2008 were well within the norms
of California politics. Utilizing an original dataset, we unravel this conundrum
by examining whether these “surge voters” were substantially different from
habitual voters, whether they have stayed engaged in electoral politics, and what
might that tell us about the future partisan and political alignment in California?
Keywords: 2008 election; 2010 election; California electorate; Obama; partisan
realignment; surge voters
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1 Landslide
The 2008 presidential election appears to be a defining moment in California’s
political development: Democratic registration surged, interest in the campaign
and voter turnout spiked upward and presidential nominee Barack Obama won
the state overwhelmingly, securing the largest percentage of the vote since 1936.
The landslide rested, at least in part, upon the participation of over 2 million firsttime voters. Yet despite this marked change in the composition of the electorate,
the 2008 election was one of remarkable stasis: no Congressional or state legislative seats in California flipped from one political party to the other and outcomes
on state-wide ballot measures were well within the historical norms.
This paper addresses a series of interrelated questions stimulated by this
apparent paradox. The answers come from a rigorous analysis of the so-called
“Obama surge voters” that came to the polls in unprecedented numbers to elect
the Democratic nominee for president. Our examination of these first-time voters

Brought to you by | University of San Francisco
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/16/14 9:15 PM

114

Corey Cook, David Latterman

offers insight into some of the more critical questions of contemporary California
politics: is the surge indicative of a new electorate and accordant partisan and
ideological alignment, or is it better understood as an ephemeral phenomenon
that would minimally affect other contests and subsequent elections? And what
are the likely consequences of these trends in voter participation for the 2012
presidential election?
After reviewing the literature about the California electorate, the empirical
portion of the paper proceeds in two parts. We first establish the breadth and
depth of the Obama victory in the 2008 election that might create expectations
for a Democratic realignment and analyze the other candidacies and issues on
the 2008 ballot to assess the macro-effects of the surge in the electorate to query
whether the surge was indeed Obama-centric. Next, we offer a systematic individual-level analysis of these surge voters to glean insight into this unique voting
demographic. Our analysis extends previous research into the California electorate by moving beyond surveys of voters and instead examining measurable
political behavior. In this section, we report findings from an original dataset constructed by the authors that combines precinct-level electoral results with individual data derived from the California Voter File. These data provide the sharpest view of the 2008 election and the evolving electorate in the state and help
refute some of the conventional wisdom and common myths about contemporary
California politics.

2 California’s “Exclusive Electorate”
A substantial body of academic research, beginning with the seminal work of
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), documents the significant differences between
voters and non-voters in American politics. Gomez, Hansford and Krause conclude from their review of this literature that “it is both well established and
widely accepted that individuals with higher levels of education and income,
among other socioeconomic factors, participate in elections at a rate greater than
their lower resourced counterparts” (Gomez et al. 2007). As for California in particular, Baldassare finds that “the people who go to the polls in California are
very different from those who don’t” (Baldassare 2006). Likely voters tend to be
unrepresentative of the state demographically: they are older, wealthier, better
educated, and more likely to be White than irregular or non-voters (Baldassare
2006). Latinos are particularly overrepresented in this latter group, a phenomenon that has muted the much-anticipated electoral impact of the growth of the
Latino population (Citrin and Highton 2002). We would expect, then, that the
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increased participation levels in the 2008 election would produce a more diverse
electorate along these various dimensions.
But aside from the demographic differences between likely voters and nonvoters, it remains unclear whether these two groups evince substantially different
preferences on issues or partisan affinities. In California, opinion surveys suggest
that voters and non-voters “have different political attitudes and preferences”
(Baldassare 2006). State-wide surveys reveal sizeable gaps about the preferred
role of government, as well as on particularly policy issues including immigration, environmental issues, healthcare and fiscal issues, among a host of others
(Baldassare 2006, 2008). So the large number of new voters in 2008, approximately 2.1 million strong, could produce a more politically progressive voting
population in the state. More specifically, Baldassare predicts that “for ballot
measures, there could be more voter support for policies that increased spending
and taxes for state programs” (Baldassare 2006).
This finding differs from the expectation of scholars who generally conclude
from national data that voters and non-voters do not exhibit distinct preferences on
issues. For instance, a recent study surmises that, “differences in the policy liberalism of voters and nonvoters are marginal” (Ellis et al. 2006). These studies tend to
reaffirm Shaffer’s oft-cited conclusion that, “the policy differences between voters
and nonvoters are presently neither large nor ideologically consistent… on most
political issues… there are not significant policy differences between voters and
non-voters” (Shaffer 1982; Bennett and Resnick 1990).
On the other hand, Baldassare’s survey research is less suggestive of
substantial partisan differences between likely voters and non-voters. He concludes that for candidate elections, it is difficult to say if increased turnout
would benefit the Republicans or the Democrats because “so many of the newly
registering voters are not in the major parties today” and new voters in California might embrace the decades-long trend towards ambivalence about the
major parties (Baldassare 2006). Research at the national level affirms this
ambiguity. In purely partisan terms, “there are indeed meaningful differences in
the partisan leanings of voters and nonvoters. But while nonvoters usually are
more Democratic than voters, there are exceptions to this tendency” (Citrin et
al. 2003). Still, the conventional wisdom about the 2008 election is that historically high turnout mattered substantially in determining the partisan outcome
at the presidential level (see Lupia 2010 for a dissenting view). Even if it is true
that increased turnout propelled Obama to victory, it remains uncertain that
this expanded electorate would systematically affect the partisan or ideological
balance of the various down-ballot contests, either ballot propositions or candidate races. In short, it seems plausible that “the electoral landscape would
not be transformed” by increased turnout as one particularly group of scholars
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concluded from their examination of previous presidential election contests
(Sides et al. 2008).
Given this previous scholarship and what is known generically about the
surge of voter engagement and Obama’s decisive victory in the 2008 election, we
consider four questions:
1. Did the dramatic increase in Democratic registration during 2008 result in
substantial increases in voting for Democratic candidates in down-ballot
races as might be expected by the marked increase in Democratic registration in California?
2. Were outcomes on state-wide ballot propositions substantially affected by
these new voters? In particular, as the extant literature predicts, is there
evidence that measures that would increase taxing and spending were more
likely to pass in 2008?
3. Were these “surge voters” substantially different demographically from
habitual voters and did the electorate become less “exclusive” as we would
expect from the literature?
4. How did these surge voters behave after the 2008 election? Which of these
surge voters participated in the 2010 gubernatorial election and what might
that tell us about the future partisan and political alignment in California?

3 Data and Methods
The data herein are from an original dataset constructed for this project and available from the authors. The data include state-wide election results aggregated at the
county and Assembly District levels from the state-wide Statement of the Vote, precinct-level returns from the Institute of Governmental Studies’ Statewide Database
and the authors’ calculations based upon data drawn from the California Voter File.
This last set of data are particularly useful for calculating the “Obama surge” vote.
We code each individual voter as either a regular voter or a surge voter. Surge voters
are those who voted in the 2008 presidential election and not previously (unless
that voter also voted only in the February 2008 presidential primary).1 In addition
to voter history, the Voter File contains names, ages, and geographic markers for

1 We utilize the post-2010 voter file for this purpose because we wanted to make retrospective
analyses about the behavior of surge voters in subsequent elections. As a result, a small proportion of the population is no longer registered to vote in the state and dropped from the analysis.
According to the Voter File, 12.2 million people on the voter rolls in 2011 cast ballots in 2008.
This number is just under 90% of the 13.7 million voters whose votes were tallied in 2008.
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each registrant. Using the method conceived by Enos (2010), we conduct a Bayesian probability to infer individual race based upon US Census name/race data and
zip code demography.2 Gender is inferred from the registrant’s name.
For geographic comparisons, we utilize the Census designation of “urban” at
the zip code level to determine urban vs. rural designation, which is the number of
housing units per zip code considered to be in an urban area.3 Lastly, our density
metric is calculated at the zip code level using national data in ArcMap, where
each zip code had a population per square mile value as of 2010. Over 99% of
voters live in a zip code that has a density value. We use quintiles for the density
categories because of the highly skewed non-normal distribution towards lowdensity zip codes. These data are available from the authors upon request.

4 The Obama Landslide in California
At first glance, the 2008 election cycle seems to portend a lasting change in California’s political equilibrium: Californians registered and voted in higher than
anticipated numbers and overwhelmingly supported the Democratic nominee
Barack Obama. The election had the largest proportional turnout of eligible voters
since 1972 and the partisan distribution of the electorate was skewed leftward.
Between 2004 and 2008, Democrats added over 950,000 voters to their rolls while
Republicans lost 8000 registrants during that period. Still, the historical data represented in Figure 1 illustrate a stark reality – the largest 1-year increase in Democratic registrants since 1972 appears as only a small uptick whether compared to
all registrants or as a proportion of the two-party registration.
These changes in party affiliation were not evenly distributed across the
state. Figure 2 shows increasing Democratic registration and increased turnout.

2 The Census provides a list of the 100,000 most common names in the USA, by race. These
data can be used to assign a probability of a race for most given American surnames. When
combined with the known ethnic breakdowns of zip codes, we assign the likely race of each
surname: White, Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Native American, and multiple race.
The most recent California name data are from the 2000 Census, but we were able to update
the data with 2010 zip code racial percentages. This technique yielded a strong match in 85%
of the names in the California voter file.
3 See http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/fedregv75n163.txt for the Census’ detailed definition for urban and rural. We used 2000 Census data for the most recent urban/rural zip code
percentages. A total of 98% of California registered voters were able to have an urban/rural
designation based on zip code. Of this, 63% of voters were in 100% urban zip codes, and 90%
were in zip codes that were defined as greater than 30% urban.
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Source: California Secretary of State, Report of Registration (2008).

Figure 1: Democratic Party Registration, 1932–2008.

Compared to 2000, a solidly Democratic year in California, increases in Democratic registration and overall voter turnout were heavily concentrated in the
coastal regions of the state, thereby reinforcing the state’s emerging geo-political
divide (Cain et al. 2008; Douzet and Miller 2008; Kousser 2009; Cook and Latterman 2011). Turnout also increased substantially in the Central Valley and the
Inland Empire regions. And ultimately, Obama’s staggering 61.1% of the vote was
the highest proportion received by a presidential candidate in 72 years. His victory
was both deep and broad. He won counties in all corners of the state including
traditionally conservative counties in the Central Valley (Fresno and Merced) and
won both Inland Empire counties (Riverside and San Bernardino), while narrowly
losing Republican strongholds Orange County and San Diego County.
Candidate Obama racked up this 24-point victory despite having lost the
state’s primary election to Hilary Clinton (51.5% to 43.2%) and despite facing
off against the Republicans’ best chance to carry the state – a moderate candidate with a track record of having performed well in California (Marelius 2008)
with demonstrated appeal to moderates and independent voters historically. The
state’s “traditional purple hue” has been cemented by moderate Republicans
like Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (Fiorina and Abrams 2008) and a similarly
situated candidate like McCain seemed primed to represent a viable candidacy in
California. That Obama carried California was not a surprise, but that he did so
by a margin nearly double that of candidates Bill Clinton, Al Gore and John Kerry
was a stunning outcome. And at least in the popular discourse and state-wide
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Figure 2: Democratic Party Registration and Overall Voter Turnout Changes by County, 2000–2008.

Source: California Secretary of State, Report of Registration (2008).
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media, much of the credit for Obama’s victory has been attributed to the “surge”
of first-time voters who comprised approximately one-sixth of the electorate.

5 An Obama Surge or a Democratic Surge?
The first empirical question is whether this surge is better understood as a partisan
or person-specific phenomenon. At least in aggregate, as the extant literature predicts given the unaffiliated nature of irregular voters, the surge appears not to have
trickled down the ballot to other partisan contests. No Congressional or state legislative seats, of the 153 contested, changed party hands and Table 1 shows that in aggregate votes, Democrats only gained slightly in the State Senate and State Assembly.4
So while Democrats did perform three to four points better in down-ballot races in
2008 than in 2004, this number is not particularly impressive given the magnitude
of the Obama victory and the spike in Democratic registration and turnout.
More significantly, there appears to be little correlation between the degree
of surge (aggregated by the smallest easily-analyzed electoral unit, state Assembly district) and the proportion of the vote garnered by Democratic candidates in
those districts.5 Figure 3 shows the change in the proportion of the vote received
by the Democratic candidate in contested Assembly races and the magnitude of
the surge in that district. While definitive causal conclusions are not possible,
the data are suggestive that the surge was directed toward Obama rather than
Democrats generically.

Presidential Election
State Senate Elections
State Assembly Elections

2004

2008

Difference

54.4%
53.7%
53.7%

61.1%
55.1%
57.8%

6.7%
1.4%
4.1%

Table 1: Proportion of the Aggregate Vote Garnered by Democratic Candidates.
Source: California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote (2004 and 2008 General Election).

4 Democratic Congressional candidates received 59.9% of the vote as compared with 53.5%
of the vote in the previous election, but most of this difference is the result of seven Democrats
running unopposed (compared with only two Republicans running unopposed) in 2008.
5 Note that these are aggregate rather than individual data and are therefore subject to the
ecologic inference fallacy. As such, it is not possible to draw reliable inferences about individual
voting behavior based solely upon these results and they ought to be interpreted with caution.
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Figure 3: Surge Proportion and Net Change in Democratic Vote, Assembly Elections 2004–2008
(r2=0.26).

6 An Obama Surge or a Liberal/Progressive Surge?
The second empirical question is whether the surge might represent an ideological shift in the electorate. The literature demonstrating substantial differences in the policy preferences of likely and non-voters might lead us to expect to
find meaningful differences in the outcomes of state-wide ballot measures than
might otherwise have occurred. Yet evidence of an impact of the surge voters on
issues on the ballot is not strongly apparent. Three ballot propositions on the
2008 election were substantively nearly identical to measures placed on previous state-wide ballots. The central features of these measures are described in
Table 2.6

6 None of these measures is exactly the same as before – the magnitude and relative cost of
the bond measures differ and Proposition 4, the 2008 measure to restrict abortions, included a
specific provision to allow notification of an adult family member rather than a parent to mollify
some critics of the previous version.
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Though these elections occur in different political and fiscal contexts, the
salience of these issues changes over time, and the electorates vary widely from
1 year to the next, the state-wide results appear quite stable over time. The consistency in the outcomes is striking regardless of the year, type of election, or
turnout level. This is unexpected given the literature on likely and non-voters
cited above, and particularly striking and puzzling for the abortion measure. Preelection polling demonstrated a substantial link between partisan affiliation and

Proposition 4
Parental Notification of Abortion
Election
2008 General
Total Votes
12,948,941
Results
48.0%
Major
Requires waiting period
Provisions
and adult relative notification with exception for
medical waiver by court
Proposition 3
Children’s Hospital Bonds
Election
2008 General
Total Votes
12,638,905
Results
55.3%
Major
$980 million in general
Provisions
obligation bonds

Proposition 12
Veterans’ Housing Bonds
Election
2008 General
Total Votes
12,288,826
Results
63.5%
Major
$900 million in general
Provisions
obligation bonds to
assist veterans purchase
farms, homes, and
mobile homes

Proposition 85

Proposition 73

2006 General
8,444,842
45.8%
Requires waiting period
and parental notification with exception for
medical waiver by court

2005 Special
7,786,022
47.2%
Requires waiting period
and parental notification with exception for
medical waiver by court

Proposition 61
2004 General
11,379,404
58.3%
$750 million general
obligation bonds, 20%
for urgent acute care
and 80% for general
acute care hospitals
Proposition 32

Proposition 16

2000 General
10,038,296
67.2%
$50 million in general
obligation bonds for
new and existing veterans’ homes

2000 Primary
7,068,129
62.3%
$500 million in general
obligation bonds for
farm and home aid for
veterans

Table 2: 2008 General Election “Re-Run” Ballot Measures.
Source: California Secretary of State: http://www.ss.ca.gov.
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preferences for Proposition 4. Republicans favored the measure by a margin of 62
to 28%, but Democrats only approved of it by 35–56% (Baldassare et al. 2008).
And regulation of abortion remains one of the key components of the divide
between the parties. Historically, there is a 24-point difference between partisans
in levels of support for passing laws that restrict abortion. The magnitude of this
divide has increased in recent years (Public Policy Institute of California 2008).
Despite heightened Democratic registration and a presidential landslide,
the overall returns on Proposition 4 appear highly consistent with the previous
parental notification measures. Results on these three propositions by county are
displayed in Figure 4 and by Assembly District in Figure 5. Both charts demonstrate
the remarkable consistency in the balloting across three distinctive elections (presidential, midterm and special) and wide variations in the size of the electorate.
As shown in Figure 6, the magnitude of the surge appears largely unrelated
to the vote on Proposition 4 (r2 = 0.03). The magnitude of the surge, aggregated at
the Assembly District level, appears largely unrelated to the vote on Proposition
4. Again, it seems that there is no apparent correlation between the surge vote
and changes in relative support for abortion restrictions.
80
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% Yes on Prop 85

% Yes on Prop 4
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Source: California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote.

Figure 4: Support for Parental Notification by County: Proposition 4 (2008), Proposition 73
(2005) and Proposition 85 (2006).
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Figure 5: Support for Proposition 4 and Average of Propositions 73 and 85 by California
Assembly District (r2=0.96).

A similar phenomenon is apparent in the state-wide results for the Children’s Hospital bonds and Veterans’ Housing bonds. The literature establishes
a distinction between the preferences of regular and non-voters in regards
to governmental spending as articulated in surveys. Accordingly, we would
expect to find that the higher turnout in 2008 would produce, in aggregate,
substantially greater support for these bond measures. However, the level of
consistency with the comparable ballot propositions from previous elections
is striking. Figure 7 shows the high correlation between Proposition 3 in 2008
and Proposition 61 in 2004 by Assembly District. Because of the legislative
redistricting that occurred after the 2000 Census, a similar analysis of Proposition 12 is not possible.7
Unlike the abortion measure, however, there is a mildly positive correlation
between the surge and support for the two bond proposals, as shown in Figure 8
and Figure 9: Assembly Districts with the highest proportion of surge voters
are indeed among the most supportive of the two bonds. Again, the ecological

7 California voters have approved all 27 veteran’s bonds appearing on state-wide ballots
historically, and results have typically fallen in a similar range of support.
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Surge Proportion of Voting Population (%)
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Source: Institute of Governmental Studies Statewide Database and authors’ calculations.

Figure 6: Support for Proposition 4 (Parental Notification) and “Surge” Proportion of the Vote
by California Assembly District (r2=0.03).

inference fallacy precludes definitive conclusions. However, it seems plausible
that surge voters might have been somewhat more supportive of these bonds than
regular voters, affirming our expectations. Taken together, however, it appears
that the electorate only became more ideologically liberal on governmental borrowing and not on social issues. This distinction merits further consideration in
subsequent research.
Despite our expectations about the likely consequences of introducing
2.1 million new voters into the electorate (16% of those who voted), it seems that
the surge was less than momentous for down ballot races and ballot propositions.
This suggests that this spike in turnout ought to be interpreted as particular to the
presidential election – a distinctly “Obama surge.”

7 Who Were the Surge Voters?
Aside from producing the largest presidential landslide in 70 years, these new
voters did not substantially impact the political equilibrium in California politics.
A larger, more diverse, less partisan and unpredictable electorate delivered an
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Figure 7: Support for Children’s Hospital Bonds: Proposition 3 (2008) and Proposition 61
(2004) by California Assembly District (r2=0.88).
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Figure 8: Support for Proposition 3 (Children’s Hospital Bonds) and “Surge” Proportion of the
Vote by California Assembly District (r2=0.44).
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Surge Proportion of Voting Population (%)
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Figure 9: Support for Proposition 12 (Veterans’ Housing Bonds) and “Surge” Proportion of the
Vote by California Assembly District (r2=0.27).

utterly predictable set of outcomes in the 2008 election in the state. Much attention, both in the scholarly literature and popular press, has been accorded to
assessing the role of new voters in the Obama victory (Beinart 2008; Ceaser and
DiSalvo 2008; Von Drehle 2008; Dreier 2009; Lupia 2010) and on the same-sex
marriage measures on the ballot in California and Florida (Egan and Sherrill 2009;
Cook and Latterman 2010; Slade and Smith 2011). Still, remarkably little is known
about these voters, and inferences about them are primarily derived from exit poll
data. This section attempts to systematically identify these enigmatic voters who
brought about both change and continuity to determine whether these “Obama
surge voters” were substantially different demographically from habitual voters
as we would expect from the literature and whether they are becoming permanently integrated into the electorate.
On this point, the data are clear. Our analysis of the voter file shows that
Obama surge voters in California were different from other voters. The electorate in 2008 was younger, more urban, more ethnically and racially diverse, and
less likely to be affiliated with either of the two major political parties as a result
of these new voters. But the Obama surge was not as demographically distinct
as we might have anticipated. Figures 10–16 compare 2008 surge voters with all
registered voters in California and two other subsets of registered voters, those
“non-surge” voters who voted in 2008, and those who have were first-time voters
after the 2008 election. Data are presented by party, age, gender, geography, and
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Figure 10: Partisan Distributions Within Categories of Voters in California.

ethnicity.8 This category of new voters, approximately 900,000 strong, offers a
particularly useful comparison between a “normal” increase in voters and one
fueled by an historical presidential campaign.
These profiles suggest that surge voters lay somewhere between likely voters
and non-voters in Baldassare’s analysis. Surge voters in 2008 were slightly more
likely to be Democratic than regular voters (46.5–45.5%), but not significantly so.
Rather, surge voters were substantially more likely to be unaffiliated with a political party (25.2% of surge voters were unaffiliated compared with 14.5% of experienced voters), something also true of new registrants generally. It turns out that
Republicans in California did not do a bad job of turning out their regular voters in
2008 – Republicans trailed Democrats by 45.5%–34.9% compared with a 13-point
gap on registration. But only one in five surge voters were registered Republicans.
Not surprisingly, as Figure 11 depicts, surge voters in 2008, were skewed dramatically younger than the general electorate. Just under 35% of the Obama surge

8 Data for the fourth subgroup, non-newly registered voters who did not vote in 2008, are
available from the authors.
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Figure 11: Age Distributions Within Categories of Voters in California.

were voters under the age 30 years. Of regular voters, only 7.8% fell into this age
bracket. Interestingly, a higher percentage of new voters in 2010 were under 30
years old than in 2008. So while Obama did inspire younger voters to turn out,
new voters in the 2008 election were more likely to be between 30 and 50 years
old than new voters in 2010.
Figure 12 shows very little differences within these categories of voters by
gender. Women were more likely to turn out to vote in 2008 than men, and were
more likely to be surge voters. But the proportion of women in the pool of registered voters is similar. Interestingly, the 2010 election counteracted this trend
somewhat – just over half of new voters in 2010 were men.
The 2008 surge was also a geographic phenomenon – more than half of
these new voters were registered in Los Angeles or Bay Area counties as shown
in Figure 13.
Accordingly, the surge was disproportionately urban in nature, as shown in
Figure 14.
Figure 15 provides a finer assessment of the significance of population density
in describing the surge. As aggregated at the zip code level, the largest source of
the surge was in the most densely populated areas in California.
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Figure 12: Gender Distributions Within Categories of Voters in California.

Lastly, a narrow majority of surge voters were people of color; Latino,
Asian and Pacific Islander, and African Americans were disproportionately
more likely to be first-time voters in 2008. A couple of things are particularly
striking about Figure 16. First is the comparison between 2008 surge voters
and new voters in 2010 (which were 62% White). The second is the relatively
low number of African Americans among surge voters. Much of the popular
fiction about the passage of the same-sex marriage ban in 2008 focused on
the role of African American voters in California who were supposedly drawn
to the polls to vote for Obama and ensured defeat of Proposition 8. While
exit polls suggest that African Americans favored Proposition 8, it is essentially impossible for first-time African American voters to have substantially
affected the outcome given the scarcity of African Americans (7.5%) amongst
the 2.1 million surge voters (Cook and Latterman 2010; Egan and Sherill 2009).
In fact, these data show the central importance of Latino voters in the 2008
election. Exit polls actually depicted a decrease in Latino turnout in California
between 2004 and 2008 (from 21% down to 18%) (Lopez 2008). But it turns
out that just under 20% of regular voters were Latino, and nearly 30% of surge
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Figure 13: Regional Distributions of Voters in California.
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Figure 14: Urban Distributions Within Categories of Voters in California by City.
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Figure 15: Population Distributions Within Categories of Voters in California by Zip Code.
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Figure 16: Racial and Ethnic Distributions Within Categories of Voters in California.
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voters were Latino.9 The same exit polls show Obama receiving 74% of the
Latino vote, compared to 63% garnered by Senator John Kerry in 2004. The
significance of this Latino vote is discussed further below.

8 The Surge Revisited
While polling of the 2008 election show definitively that new voters were more
likely to support Obama in the presidential election, we argue that they have
minimal impact on other electoral outcomes. One reason for this is provided in
Table 3: roll-off between the presidential election and other contests increased
substantially between 2004 and 2008; it seems likely that a good percentage of
these surge voters likely chose not to participate in down-ballot elections.
But the unique demography of the Obama surge vote, particularly in terms
of age, ethnicity and partisanship, simultaneously produced a landslide and
stasis on other contests. In Figures 17, 18 and 19, we incorporate Census to demonstrate the complexity of the voting patterns on the ballot propositions discussed above. Precincts are color-coded to indicate the proportion of Latinos.
While the bulk of predominantly Latino precincts tends toward the upper range
of the support for Obama (centered around the 75% range) they appear more
conservative than we might expect on each of the ballot measures (more in favor
of the restrictions on abortion rights and less in favor of the two bond measures).
This accounts for some of the apparent contradiction: surge voters were simply
less partisan and liberal than we might expect given their heightened support
Obama.10 This result is fully consistent with Highton and Wolfinger’s contention
that “the ‘party of non-voters’ is heterogeneous” (Highton and Wolfinger 2001).

House Elections
State Senate Elections
State Assembly Elections

2004

2008

6.3%
8.7%
8.1%

9.0%
9.1%
11.8%

Table 3: Proportion of the Undervotes Relative to the Presidential Election.
Source: California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote (2004 and 2008 General Election).

9 The Public Policy Institute of California’s statewide surveys estimate that only 18% of likely
voters in the 2010 election are Latino (Public Policy Institute of California 2010).
10 Note that the oddly shaped tail of these distributions is largely centered in Los Angeles County.
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Figure 17: Proposition 4 (Parental Notification) and Obama by Precinct and Proportion Latino.
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Figure 18: Proposition 3 (Children’s Hospital Bonds) and Obama by Precinct and Proportion
Latino.
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Figure 19: Proposition 12 (Veterans’ Housing Bonds) and Obama by Precinct and Proportion Latino.

9 Whither the Surge?
Despite reinforcing, rather than fundamentally restructuring, the ideological
and partisan alignment of the California electorate, the Obama surge remains
a potent political phenomenon. The 2.1 million new voters in the 2008 election dwarfs the number of new voters in 2010 and is quite distinctive in terms
of geography, partisanship and ethnicity. If the 2008 surge population were to
stay engaged politically, the exclusive electorate would become less so. A series
of studies have argued that the Latino vote has been relatively insignificant in
California; “the three percentage point or so gain provided by Latino voters (to
Democratic gubernatorial candidates) clearly is only part of the story, a relatively small part” (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Highton and Citrin 2002). Our data
suggest that surge voters were disproportionately likely to be Latino, and also
African American and Asian and Pacific Islander. In this final empirical section,
we examine the post-Obama electoral behavior of Obama surge voters to predict
whether these voters might become more regular participants in the electoral
process.
In short, the evidence for sustained engagement is not encouraging. Generally speaking, only 42% of the surge voters participated in the 2010 gubernatorial
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Figure 20: Proportion of Surge Voters Participating in 2010 Gubernatorial Election by
Demographic Groupings.

election as marked by the reference line in Figure 20. Those who returned to
the polls skewed older, more partisan, more Republican, more White, and more
rural. Indeed, if the Republicans are to take anything from the historical victories scored by the Democrats in the 2010 election, the first time since 1883 the
Democrats won all state-wide offices and both chambers of the state legislature,
it is that their new voters were more likely to stay engaged in electoral politics.
Figure 21 depicts the participation rates of surge voters in the 2010 election by
zip code. Note that the regions within which the surge was most pronounced (Los
Angeles and Bay Area) experiences the steepest declines in participation. Rather,
continued engagement was far more likely in less urban and less dense zip codes
and in the inland portion of California.
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2008 Surge Voters
by Zip Code
% surge voters who voted in 2010
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30.1%–40.0%
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50.1%–60.0%
60.1%–100.0%

Figure 21: Proportion of Surge Voters Participating in 2010 Gubernatorial Election By Zip Code.

In sum, our research is highly suggestive that the Obama surge, though historic in many respects, was ephemeral and largely restricted to the presidential
election. Whether legions of new voters turn out for the 2012 contest or former
surge voters re-enter the electorate is indeterminate at this stage, but it seems
highly unlikely to expect a similar flood given their rapid disengagement in 2010.
Though these predictions about the future are tentative, one clear benefit of the
data reported herein is that they permit conjectures on the basis of behavioral,
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rather than merely attitudinal, data and accordingly provide some guideposts
concerning future behaviors.
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